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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Extends Younger Comity
Doctrine.-A default judgment was entered in a New York state court
against Harry Vail after Vail defaulted on a credit arrangement with a private
loan company. When Vail failed to pay the judgment, he was served with a
subpoena pursuant to New York law, requiring him to appear at a deposition
in order to give information relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment. It
was stated on the subpoena that failure to comply was punishable as a
contempt of court. When Vail did not comply, a local justice, Juidice, issued
an order requiring him to appear in court and show cause why he should not
be held in contempt. Vail failed to appear, was held in contempt, and fined.
When Vail did not pay his fine, an ex parte commitment order was issued
pursuant to which Vail was arrested and imprisoned. On the following day,
when he paid the fine, Vail was released.
Vail, along with others similarly situated, then instituted a section 19831 suit
on behalf of a class of judgment debtors in a federal district court, naming the
state court justices who had employed the contempt procedures as federal
defendants. 2 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the New York contempt procedures
leading to imprisonment as violative of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 3 The federal defendants argued that the federal suit was
barred by Younger v. Harris4 and, therefore, that the district court should
abstain from reaching the merits. The district court disagreed, however,
holding that Younger did not bar federal injunctive relief against state civil
proceedings because Younger was only applicable when the state action was
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
The pertinent jurisdictional statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by
any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States .... "
For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and development of section 1983, see Develop-
ments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Ilarv. L. Rev. 1133 (1977).
2. The federal suit was certified as a class action. The class, as defined, included "all persons
who have been or are presently subject to the civil contempt proceedings contained in the
challenged sections of the Judiciary Law." Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1215 (1977).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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criminal or quasi-criminal in nature.5 The court then found the sections of the
New York Judiciary Law at issue unconstitutional6 and permanently enjoined
the application of those statutes to plaintiffs or to members of plaintiffs' class.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Younger was not
limited solely to criminal or quasi-criminal state actions and that it was
therefore error for the district court to have reached the merits of the
constitutional claim. Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
In Younger v. Harris,7 the Supreme Court articulated the principles re-
straining the granting of federal equitable relief8 against state court proceed-
ings.9 Younger involved a state criminal prosecution which was pending when
the state defendant filed his federal action to enjoin the local district attorney
from prosecuting him under an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The
Court held that federal injunctive relief was improper to stay a pending state
criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances or a bad faith prose-
cution.10 It based its holding on two grounds: first, the "basic doctrine of
5. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Juidice v. Vail, 97
S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
6. Id. at 955-56; N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 756-57, 770, 772-75 (McKinney 1975).
7. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger, along with five other similar cases decided on the same day,
comprise what is commonly referred to as the Younger Sextet or the February Sextet. Brne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Miackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971).
The Younger doctrine is to be distinguished from the doctrine of abstention enunciated in
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The thrust of the latter case is that
federal jurisdiction is postponed, not relinquished, so that state courts can first have the
opportunity to interpret issues of state law. See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H.
Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1043-45 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]. See also A.C.L.U. v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
There is some confusion concerning whether Younger should be referred to as an abstention
doctrine. Some courts and commentators have carefully noted that the principles of Younger are
those of equitable restraint, not abstention. See, e.g., Louisville Area Inter-Faith Comm. for
United Farm Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., 542 F.2d 652, 653 (6th Cir. 1976); Hart &
Wecbsler, supra at 1009-50. The Supreme Court, however, in a comprehensive reiew of federal
abstention, listed Younger as a species of federal abstention. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976). This note will use both terms.
8. The holding in Younger was limited to the issuance of federal injunctive relief where a
state criminal prosecution was pending. 401 U.S. at 41 & n.2. In a companion case, the Court
held that Younger rules also applied where federal declaratory relief was sought in the same
situation. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). For a general discussion of the holding in
Younger, see Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 740 (1974).
9. The power of the federal courts to issue injunctive relief against unconstitutional acts by
state officials was established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10. 401 U.S. at 53-54. As an example of "extraordinary circumstances," the Court mentioned
a prosecution under a statute that was "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever mannerand against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it."Id. (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402
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equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly
should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
equitable relief";" and secondly, the "even more vital consideration"'
' 2 of
comity that the federal and state judicial systems should each carry on its
legitimate functions without undue interference from the other.' 3 These
(1941)). In its most recent pronouncement in the Younger area, the Court has indicated that this
particular example of extraordinary circumstances is a very narrow exception to Younger. Trainor
v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977). In Trainor, the Court suggested that the finding of a district
court that certain sections of an Illinois attachment statute were "on their face patently violative
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 1916, was not enough to trigger
the application of the "patently and flagrantly" unconstitutional exception, id. at 1920. In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Stevens accused the majority of reducing this exception to the mere "Illusion
of flexibility" while in fact "eliminat[ing] one of the exceptions from the doctrine." Id. at 1928
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He also cogently observed that the "Court has never explained why all
sections of any statute must be considered invalid in order to justify an injunction against a
portion that is itself flagrantly unconstitutional." Id.
Concerning other kinds of extraordinary circumstances which might mandate an exception to
Younger, the Court has explained that "[t]he very nature of 'extraordinary circumstances,' of
course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient
threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state
criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be 'extraordinary'
in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not
merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual iituation." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 124-25 (1975).
The bad faith exception to Younger deries from Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In
Dombrowski, a civil rights organization and its officers sought to enjoin state officials from
prosecuting them under an allegedly overbroad Louisiana Subversive Activities statute. Id. at
482. The federal plaintiffs showed that the state officials had harrassed the operations of their
organization by repeated arrests, threatened arrests, and seizures of documents. Id. at 487-89.
The Court held that under such circumstances, the plaintiffs had showed sufficient irreparable
harm to justify federal equitable relief. Id. at 489. The suggestion in Younger is that federal
intervention is warranted upon a showing of bad faith and harassment because a bad faith
prosecution will not provide the potential federal plaintiff with an adequate forum for the
vindication of constitutional rights. 401 U.S. at 48-49, see Federal Equitable Restraint: A
Younger Analysis in New Settings, 35 Md. L. Rev. 483, 488 n.29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Younger Analysis].
It is clear that these exceptions to Younger will be interpreted strictly in order to allow federal
intervention only in the most egregious cases. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State
Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 535, 606 (1970).
11. 401 U.S. at 43-44.
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. Justice Black, writing for the majority, labeled this notion of comity as " 'Our
Federalism' " and described it as follows: "The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States'
Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts. . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States." Id.
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principles mandate equitable restraint in the criminal context because the
state interest in the definition and enforcement of its criminal statutes is more
important than the potential federal plaintiff's need of a federal forum-at
least where the federal plaintiff is assured of an adequate state forum in which
to raise his constitutional claims.
14
These principles behind equitable restraint were articulated in the context
of state criminal proceedings, and the cases cited in Younger in which
equitable relief had been denied were in this very same context.' 5 Although
there is language in Justice Black's majority opinion which indicates that the
considerations underlying Younger might also apply to pending state civil
proceedings,' 6 the Court did not explicitly deal with that issue. 17 Only Justice
Stewart, in his concurring opinion, spoke specifically of Younger principles in
a civil context. He briefly noted that the Court's equity and comity rationales
mandating equitable restraint in Younger would be less forceful when the
underlying state suit was civil because the state interest in a civil proceeding is
less than its interest in a criminal proceeding.' 8 Whether in fact the Court
would extend Younger to hold that a federal court should abstain when the
underlying state action is civil remained unanswered until the case of
Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd. 19
In a later case, the Court stated more specifically that the doctrine of comity was designed to
prevent federal interference with state judicial proceedings because such interference would: (1)
prevent a state from effectuating its substantive policies; (2) prevent a state from providing a
forum for the vindication of constitutional rights infringed by those policies; (3) result in
duplicative legal proceedings; and (4) would reflect negatively on the state judicial system.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
The doctrine of Younger comity is a matter of judicial discretion which manifests itself by
federal "abstention." See generally Younger Analysis, supra note 10, at 485-86. Younger comity
supplements the anti-injunction statute, which represents the congressional expression of the
doctrine of comity. See note 28 infra.
14. 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
15. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (prosecution under local solicitation
ordinance); Williams v. MAiller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942) (per curiam) (threatened prosecution under
state statute licensing contractors); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) (prosecution under state
statutes regulating business of persons holding music copyrights); Beal v. Missouri Pac. .RL,
312 U.S. 45 (1941) (prosecution under state full train crew law); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (prosecution under state unfair trade statute); Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240 (1926) (prosecution under state statute forbidding certain futures transactions). See
generally Note, The New Federal Comity: Pursuit of Younger Ideas in a Ciril Context, 61 Iowa
L. Rev. 784, 789-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Federal Comity).
16. For example, after discussing the philosophy behind the doctrine of comity, Justice Black
stated: "This brief discussion should be enough to suggest some of the reasons why it has been
perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such
injunctions." 401 U.S. at 45.
17. Id. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 55 & n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Between Younger and Huffman, the Court had at least four
occasions to consider the question of the applicability of Younger to civil proceedings. See Sosna
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In Huffman, local officials in Ohio attempted to close a theatre exhibiting
pornographic films. The officials invoked an Ohio public nuisance statute20
pursuant to which they instituted a nuisance proceeding in the state court. 21
Judgment was rendered against the defendant. Rather than appeal the
decision within the Ohio state court system, however, Pursue, Ltd. 22 insti-
tuted a section 198323 action in federal court seeking injunctive relief on the
ground that the operation of the Ohio nuisance statute constituted a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights under the color of state law. A three-judge district
court was convened 24 and, apparently without considering Younger, held that
some of the provisions of the statute constituted an overly broad prior
restraint on first amendment rights and permanently enjoined enforcement of
those provisions. 25 On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the district court, holding that the principles of Younger mandated federal
abstention even though the state proceedings were civil in nature. 26
In extending Younger to civil proceedings, the Court clarified a question it
had left unsettled in Mitchum v. Foster.27 The issue in Mitchum was a
narrow one: whether the federal anti-injunction statute28 was an absolute bar
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 nn.2 & 3 (1975); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1974)
(per curiam); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
244 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
20. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3767.01-.99 (Page 1971).
21. The Ohio statute provided that a place showing obscene films was a nuisance which could
be closed for up to one year. In addition, any personal property used in "conducting"
the nuisance could be sold. 420 U.S. at 595-97.
22. Pursue had succeeded to a property interest in the theatre prior to the state court final
judgment against its predecessor. The district court held that Pursue had standing in the federal
court to bring its action. 420 U.S. at 598-99 n.10.
23. See note 1 supra.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)) provided
that a three-judge court must be convened where a federal injunction was sought against the
operation of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. Appeal from a decision of a three-judge
district court was directly to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). Enacted in response to
the decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that federal injunctions could issue against
state officials acting unconstitutionally, section 2281 was designed to alleviate the friction caused
when a single judge prevented the effectuation of state policies by granting such relief. See S.
Rep. No. 204, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). The statute was repealed largely for reasons of
judicial economy as well as because subsequent decisional law and statutory and rule changes
lessened the evil which the three-judge court was designed to prevent. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. The current
three-judge court statute retains the requirements of a three-judge court when specifically
required by an act of Congress or in any case involving reapportionment of congressional districts
or state legislatures. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
25. No. C 72-432 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 1973). For a discussion of the district court opinion,
see 5 U. Tol. L. Rev. 171 (1973).
26. The Court remanded to the district court for determination of whether the case fits within
one of the Younger exceptions and therefore was appropriate for federal injunctive relief.
27. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The section states that '[a] court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
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to the granting of federal equitable relief in section 1983 actions . 9 An
affirmative answer would have rendered irrelevant any Younger consid-
erations since the anti-injunction statute in and of itself would have operated
to preclude the granting of federal equitable relief. The Court found that
section 1983 was an act of Congress which explicitly contemplated federal
injunctions in civil rights suits and, therefore, fell within the "expressly
authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute.30 However, the Court
confined its holding to the fact that a federal court had the power to enjoin
state court litigation. 31 It refused to comment on how and when that power
should be exercised against state civil proceedings, thereby leaving unan-
swered the question of how Younger might affect the result in Afitchum. 32
Nevertheless, the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger, joined by two
Section 2283 is a modem version of the original federal anti-injunction statute which was
enacted in 1793. The original statute provided flatly that no "writ of injunction be granted (by
any federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a state ... ." Act of MuIrch 2, 1793, ch. 22,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335. The origins of the original statute are obscure. See the discussion in Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-32 (1941). However, its purpose was clearly to
"prevent needless friction between state and federal courts." Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).
Despite the seemingly rigid language of the original statute, the court interpreted it to allow
exceptions. Injunctions were permitted against state court proceedings despite the anti-injunction
statute when certain acts of Congress called for such injunctions, when federal courts in in rem
proceedings had first acquired jurisdiction over the res, when a defeated federal litigant sought
relitigation of the same issues in a state court and when the United States or one of its agencies
was plaintiff in a federal court. See the discussion and cases cited in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 233-36 (1972).
In 1941, however, the Court in its decision in Toucey reimposed much of the literal stringency
of the anti-injunction statute by disapproving of all the non-statutory exceptions save the in rem
exception. Congress responded to the Court's literal reading of the statute in Toucey by codifying
the pre-Toucey exceptions in section 2283, thereby restoring "the basic law as generally under-
stood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., ist Sess., A
181-82 (1947). The Court has stated that the current version of the anti-injunction statute
embodied in section 2283 is "an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings
unless the injunction falLs within one of three specifically defined exceptions." Atlantic Coast
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
29. 407 U.S. at 226.
30. Id. at 242-43. The expressly authorized exception in section 2283 is one of three statutory
exceptions to the general ban against federal injunctions. See note 28 supra. To fall within this
exception, it is not necessary for a particular act to expressly refer to section 2283 or to explicitly
provide for a federal injunction against state court proceedings. Id. at 237-38. The test is
"whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or a remedy enforceable in a federal
court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding." Id.
at 238. For examples of other acts found to be "expressly authorized" exceptions, see Studebaker
Corp. v. Gittlen, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (Securities and Exchange Act); Dilworth v. Riner,
343 F.2d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1965) (1964 Civil Rights Act). For a general discussion of the other
two exceptions to the anti-injunction statute, see C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 47, at 204
(3d ed. 1976).
31. 407 U.S. at 243.
32. Id.
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other Justices, did state that on remand the district court should consider
Younger before proceeding to the merits of the section 1983 action. 33 The
obvious implication was that Younger could be a bar to a section 1983 action
even if the anti-injunction statute was not. The decision in Hi!ffman settled
the issue by holding that Younger style comity would preclude the issuance of
federal equitable relief based on a section 1983 claim, at least where the civil
proceedings were of a quasi-criminal nature.3 4
A comparison of Huffman with Mitchum is important beyond the mere fact
that Huffman answered a question posed by Mitchum. Rather, the deeper
significance of the cases lies in the fact that in both the Court had squarely
poised in contradistinction a statute ostensibly granting access to the federal
courts and a doctrine denying access. But in Huffman, unlike in Mitchum, the
Court found the doctrine denying access more compelling. In holding that
Younger mandated federal dismissal of Pursue's action, the Court clearly ac-
corded the considerations of Younger 35 a higher priority than those of section
1983.36 The Court simply ignored its language in Mitchum and in other cases
which forcefully emphasized the congressional purpose of section 1983 to
make the federal courts the "guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power." 37 Thus, Huffman evidenced a change in the Court's attitude toward
33. Id. at 244 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
34. The Court defined a quasi-criminal civil action as a "proceeding which in important
respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." 420 U.S. at 604. In
labeling this action quasi-criminal, the Court emphasized several factors: First, as in a criminal
case, the state was a party to this civil nuisance case; and second, the civil statute was closely
related to a criminal statute prohibiting the showing of obscene films and, therefore, was designed
to further the very interest underlying the criminal statute.
Because of the holding in Juidice, the interpretation of "quasi-criminal" is no longer a pivotal
issue in applying Younger in the civil context. However, for a list of some of the questions raised
by this quasi-criminal standard, see Federal Comity, supra note 15, at 812. See generally Note,
Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 870, 887-91
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Abstention].
35. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 37 infra and accompanying text. Such a result was obviously not the sole option
open to the Court. Had it accorded a higher priority to section 1983 considerations, it could have
reconciled Younger by holding that all section 1983 a:tions fit within the Younger special
circumstances exception. See note 10 supra and accompanying text; Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 217 (1972).
37. 407 U.S. at 239. The Court has stated that the federal courts, through section 1983, have
been made the "primary and powerful refiances for vindicating every right given by tho
Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464
(1974) (quoting F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65 (1928)
(emphasis added)). In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), the Court stated: "We yet like to
believe that wherever the Federal Courts sit, human rights under the Federal Constitution are
always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline the exercise
of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other fo-
rum." 389 U.S. at 248 (quoting Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945)).
In Mitchum, the Court further declared: "Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private
citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of
state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation." 407 U.S. at 239.
[Vol. 46
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section 1983 suits in federal court-a change which narrowed the availability
of such relief.38
Huffrnan shaped the civil comity doctrine in two specific ways: first, it
extended Younger principles to civil proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature;
and second, it held that Younger required exhaustion of state appellate
remedies, even in a section 1983 suit, before a party could invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court. Huffrnan further suggested as a corollary that
failure to pursue state remedies would result in loss of the section 1983 federal
remedy. 39
In extending Younger to non-criminal cases, the Court was careful to
delineate the bounds of its decision: Huffinan was not meant to be an
extension of the Younger doctrine to civil cases in general. 40 Rather, the
majority held that Huffman marked a narrow extension of the Younger
doctrine to the facts then at bar and nothing more. 41 Because of the
quasi-criminal nature of the state proceedings. the Court was still able to
predicate federal restraint on both of the grounds relied on in Younger-
comity4 2 and the traditional reluctance of equity to interfere with a state's
criminal processes. 43 This was significant because the Court left unclear
whether it would view the civil comity rationale as capable of mandating
38. There are several reasons why a potential section 1983 plaintiff would want to bring his
action in a federal court. First, if the attack is directed against some state action, he may feel
more confident of unbiased adjudication in the federal court. However, this was dearly rejected
as a valid ground for allowing federal court action in Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.)
(per curiam), applicationfor stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). In
Cousins, the Seventh Circuit stated: "Unless some showing is made to the contrary, we must
assume that an Illinois court would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly
presented to it. The mere possibility, unsupported by allegation or evidence, that a state judge
might make a flagrantly erroneous ruling on a federal issue is an insufficient basis for federal
intervention in the orderly progress of state litigation." Id. at 607.
Second, the potential federal plaintiff may feel that a federal judge is more competent to
adjudicate federal rights than a state judge. See Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1971). Finally, the potential
federal plaintiff may feel that the federal courts will afford him quicker and more efficient
adjudication of his constitutional rights. See generally Federal Comity, supra note 15, at 80.
39. 420 U.S. at 611 n.22.
40. Id. at 607.
41. Id. Before Huffman, several lower court cases had already extended Younger to civil
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. See MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 523 F.2d 1255 (Sth Cir. 1975);
Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Palaio v.
McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972).
42. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
43. Id. Huffman, of course, was not a true criminal prosecution. However, the Court was
able to apply this equity rationale by reasoning that the state's interest in preventing the
dissemination of obscene material was exactly the same whether it moved under the civil nuisance
statute or under the criminal statutes. Therefore, the nuisance proceeding was equated with the
state's "paramount role" in defining and enforcing its criminal laws. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see note 34 supra.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
Younger abstention independent of the traditional equity considerations. 4 4 It
therefore remained questionable whether Younger could be extended in the
civil context beyond those factual situations which resembled Hqffman.4 5
Precedents were not lacking, however, for an extension of Younger to civil
cases other than those of a quasi-criminal nature. In Cousins v. Wigoda,46
federal plaintiffs, losers in a contest to become delegates to the 1972 Demo-
cratic National Convention, sought to enjoin their victorious opponents from
obtaining a state court injunction preventing tie losers from challenging the
election. On Younger grounds, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
an order of the district court granting the federal injunction.4 7 In applying
Younger to this purely civil proceeding, the court conceded that comity
considerations were less compelling in a civil suit where the state interest was
not as strong as in a criminal case.48 But the court nevertheless held that such
considerations required "special respect" for the state judicial process and
mandated federal abstention where the federal suit was initiated after the
state civil suit.
4 9
Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Justice, denied a stay of the Seventh
Circuit's decision. He held that prior Supreme Court decisions clearly indi-
cated that federal courts should not "casually enjoin the conduct of pending
state court proceedings of [either criminal or civil] type." '51 The importance of
Cousins is that the underlying state proceeding was not quasi-criminal in
nature and, consequently, the denial of federal relief was predicated solely
upon comity grounds. 52 This case, therefore, represented a more expansive
44. It should be recalled that the roots of the Younger doctrine lie in cases where state
criminal prosecutions were sought to be enjoined. The decisions relied heavily on traditional
equitable reluctance to interfere with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. See note 15 supra
and accompanying text. For instance, in Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935),
the Court stated that "(tihe general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement
of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional." Id at 95; accord, Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162-64 (1943). The importance of this consideration has been clearly
acknowledged by the Court. "The maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution
summarizes centuries of weighty experience in Anglo-American law." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
45. Several subsequent lower court decisions limited Huffman to civil proceedings of a
quasi-criminal nature. See, e.g., Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366, 374 (D. Conn. 1976); Rite
Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1166-67 (D.N.J. 1976), appeal filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1977) (No. 76-1037).
46. 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), application for stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
47. 463 F.2d at 606.
48. Id. This was a specific reference to Justice Stewart'. language in his concurring opinion in
Younger. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
49. 463 F.2d at 606.
50. Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972).
51. Id. at 1206.
52. Accord, Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
The Court in Lynch felt that the application of Younger prnciples should not depend on whether
the state proceedings were labeled criminal or civil, but rather should be based on an "analysis of
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view of the Younger doctrine than that espoused by the Court in Hzjffman.
Indeed, Cousins anticipated the Court's holding in Juidice that comity
considerations alone could mandate federal abstention where the underlying
state civil proceeding was not quasi-criminal in nature.53
The second way in which Huffrnan shaped the emerging civil comity
doctrine was to hold that Younger requires a litigant losing in the state courts
to exhaust state appellate remedies even in a section 1983 action unless he
could bring himself within one of the exceptions to Younger.54 One of the
results of this requirement, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in
Huffman, would be that the mere filing of a complaint in a state court would
require a potential section 1983 litigant to exhaust state appellate remedies
before seeking federal relief."5 The practical result of this is to render the
section 1983 remedy meaningless where a state suit is filed first since an
adverse decision rendered by the highest state court gives the litigant an
appeal as of right to the Supreme Court.56 Thus, although Huffnan left the
the competing interests in each case." Id. at 773. Accordingly, the court refused to enjoin the
enforcement of a "possibly overbroad" state court order restraining certain persons from entering
school property where there was a state civil action pending. Id. at 775.
53. In addition to Cousins, there were several Supreme Court cases which indicated that
certain Justices did not view Younger as limited solely to quasi-criminal civil proceedings. In
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Supreme Court reversed a district
court holding that the federal anti-injunction statute precluded a section 1983 challenge to the
constitutionality of state prejudgment garnishment statutes. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, noted that he would affirm the
lower court's decision on the basis of Younger, arguing that it was "equally applicable where state
civil litigation [was] in progress . . . ." Id. at 561 (White, J., dissenting); accord, Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97-98 (1972) (\White, J., dissenting).
Similarly, in Schmidt v. Lessard, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), vacating and remanding 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the Court vacated the district court's granting of equitable relief against
Wisconsin's commitment procedures for the mentally ill and remanded for reconsideration in light
of Huffman. The district court had considered Younger inapplicable to non-criminal proceedings.
349 F. Supp. at 1083. The Court's remand, therefore, could be read as an indication of the
majority's view that Huffman was not necessarily limited to its facts. But see Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), in which Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, cited Huffman for the narrow proposition that abstention is appropriate
in cases of "state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at
obtaining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films .... " Id. at 816.
For a general discussion of pre-Huffman lower court interpretations of Younger, see Federal
Comity, supra note 15, at 801-04 & n.172.
54. 420 U.S. at 608; see note 10 supra and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 615. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Once a litigant has suffered an adverse decision rendered by the highest court of a state
declaring a state statute valid over constitutional objections, appeal to the Supreme Court is
available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) which states: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of
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potential section 1983 litigant with a route to the Supreme Court, that route
may well not provide as effective a method of adjudicating his constitutional
claims as would a section 1983 action.
5 7
In holding that Younger requires the potential section 1983 litigant to
exhaust state appellate remedies, Huffman arguably was inconsistent with the
earlier holding of Monroe v. Pape.58 With respect to section 1983, Monroe
had stated that "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked."5 9 Rather than read this language broadly, the Hioffman Court
interpreted Monroe as applying only where no state suit was pending and, in
that situation, to allow the section 1983 plaintiff to bring his suit in the federal
courts without first initiating a state court action. 60 Therefore, the Court was
able to reconcile Huffman with Monroe by holding, in effect, that the federal
remedy was supplementary to the state remedy only where no state proceed-
ings had been initiated against the potential section 1983 plaintiff. Where the
state proceedings had already begun, Younger requires exhaustion of state
appellate remedies. Thus, the effect of Huffman was to limit Monroe severely.
The Huffman Court, moreover, took this logic a step further by suggesting
that the failure to pursue state appellate remedies might, under Younger,
result in the loss of the right to bring a section 1983 action in a federal court. 6 1
The effect of this would be that the potential federal plaintiff, by failing to
pursue his remedy in a state court after the initial adverse trial court decision,
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favor of its validity." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
Additionally, the Huffman Court noted that traditional principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel may operate to bar relitigation in a federal court of a section 1983 action which has
substantially been decided in the state court suit. 420 U.S. at 606 n.18. Although this issue has
not been decided, the Court has observed that res judicata principles are "fully applicable" to
section 1983 actions. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973). Indeed, lower courts have
applied those principles to foreclose section 1983 suits. See, e.g., Chism v. Price, 457 F.2d 1037,
1040 (9th Cir. 1972); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970). See
generally Equitable Abstention, supra note 34, at 912-18.
57. Even though a section 1257 appeal is as of right, the Court, perhaps necessarily, disposes
of most cases through summary affirmance or dismissals. See Note, The Freund Report: A
Statistical Analysis and Critique, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 878. 902-03 (1974). Hence, "the reality of
such review is questionable." Younger Analysis, supra note 10, at 499 & n.86. Indeed, the Court
itself has questioned section 1257 review as an alternative to a section 1983 action in a federal
court. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
58. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
59. Id. at 183.
60. 420 U.S. at 609 n.21.
61. The Court in Huffman, though suggesting this result, did not have to decide this issue. In
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the potential federal plaintiff did not appeal a state order
declaring a film obscene and ordering its seizure. "It may be that under Huffman . . . the failure
of appellees to appeal the [state court order through the state judicial system] would itself
foreclose resort to federal court, absent extraordinary circumstances bringing the case within
some exception to Younger v. Harris." Id. at 351 n.20. Again, however, the Court did not decide
this issue.
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would have lost his state remedy and, under Younger, would be denied his
section 1983 federal remedy.
In Juidice v. Vail,62 the underlying state suit was not quasi-criminal in
nature. The Court nevertheless held that the principles of Younger and
Huffman mandated federal abstention in the subsequent section 1983 action, 63
and it thereby extended those principles for the first time to civil proceedings
beyond the narrow confines of the Huffinan quasi-criminal factual setting. In
thus expanding the doctrine of civil comity, the Court could not rely on the
traditional reluctance of equity to interfere with the state criminal process, a
rationale employed in both Younger"4 and Huffman.65 Accordingly, the
Court, with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, justified federal
abstention by relying solely on the " 'more vital consideration' " of comity, 66
thereby establishing that doctrine as an independent basis for denying federal
equitable relief. The significance of this step is clear. With the quasi-criminal
rationale now an unessential element in applying Younger to civil cases, the
foundation is laid in Juidice for the potential application of Younger to more,
if not all, types of civil actions.
Since the Court in Juidice, as in Huffmnan, reserved the question of the
applicability of Younger to civil cases in general, 67 it is unclear what the
impact of Juidice will be. However, the case can be read in three ways.
Based on the Court's refusal to extend Younger to civil cases in general, the
most narrow reading would limit the significance of Juidice to its facts. This
reading is further supported by the uniquely essential function of contempt
proceedings to the effectuation of a state's judicial process-a function which
the Court clearly perceived. 68 Such a reading, in conjunction with Huffman,
would limit the applicability of Younger to civil proceedings of a quasi-
criminal nature and to those involving a state's contempt power. This narrow
reading, however, does not seem plausible in light of broad language in
Juidice which indicates that the Court does not view Younger as being
confined solely to these narrow types of civil cases. 69 Furthermore, the general
trend of the Court has been to extend the applicability of Younger70 and thus
62. 97 S.Ct. 1211 (1977).
63. Id. at 1216-17.
64. 401 U.S. at 43-44; see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
65. 420 U.S. at 604-05; see note 34 supra and accompanying text.
66. 97 S.Ct. at 1217.
67. Id. at 1218 n.13.
68. Id. at 1217 & n.12. The Court further indicated that whether the contempt procedure
was labeled criminal or civil was not an important distinction. Id. at 1217.
69. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Hicks v. M iranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (principles of Younger require dismissal
of federal action where state action filed subsequent to federal action and where no -proceedings
of substance on the merits" have taken place in federal courts); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592 (1975) (principles of Younger require dismissal of federal action where underlying state action
is quasi-criminal in nature); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (federal issuance of
declaratory judgments barred by principles of Younger where state criminal prosecution is
pending). But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (Younger does not bar federal relief
where criminal prosecution is only threatened).
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there is little reason to conclude that the logic of comity in civil cases has no
further application beyond the factual situations contemplated in Hifman
and Juidice.
A second reading, advanced by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion, is
that Juidice merely postpones the formal announcement that Younger will be
extended to all civil cases.7 1 Justice Brennan based his reading of Juidice on
the fact that the underlying state suits were between private litigants and,
therefore, that the state interests involved were slight. 7" He saw this as an
indication that the Court was willing to apply Younger even where the state
interest was outweighed by other considerations, and accordingly concluded
that the Court's reference to the state contempt power was simply a "cover"
for that purpose. 73 However, Justice Brennan's prediction is not supported by
the language in the majority opinion. The Court speaks of the state's
contempt power as "surely an important interest"74 and lying at "the core of
the administration of a State's judicial system . . . . 5 Indeed, the entire
focus of the majority's analysis is on the importance of the contempt power to
the state's judicial system. Far from considering the state interest slight, the
Court seems to have found it quite substantial. Thus, despite some broad
71. 97 S.Ct. at 1222 & n. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even if Younger were extended to all civil
cases, federal equitable relief would still be available, despite a pending state proceeding, where
the federal plaintiff can show that he will not have an adequate opportunity to present his federal
claim in the state proceedings, or where one of the exceptions to Younger applies. Id. at 12 18-19;
see note 10 supra and accompanying text. However, failure to take advantage of the opportunity
to present constitutional claims in the state proceedings will foreclose federal relief. Id. at 1218.
72. Id. at 1221-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Certainly, Justice Brennan is correct that where a
civil action is between two private litigants based on a statute whose primary purpose is the
protection of private rights, the state interest is slight. See generally Federal Comity, supra note
15, at 812-13. However, this was not the case in Juidice where the court carefully noted that the
contempt statutes, though an aid to private litigants, served a crucial function in maintaining the
authority of the state judicial system. 97 S. Ct. at 1217 n.12.
If Younger were extended to all pending civil cases, regardless of the state's interest in the issue,
the Court would be saying, in effect, that the federal interest in protecting federal rights by
intervening in state court proceedings is even slighter than the state interest provided the
potential federal plaintiff is afforded adequate opportunity to raise his federal rights In the state
proceeding. However, such an extension would not seem sound because situations may arise
where the potential harm to an individual resulting from the enforcement of an allegedly
unconstitutional state civil statute against him would outweigh any state interest involved. See
generally Federal Comity, supra note 15, at 812-13. In such situations, the balance would seem
to favor federal relief if the state defendant decides to .:hoose a federal forum. Cf. Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) ("In thus expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed
the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal
forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that
duty is not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally
with the federal courts, '. .. to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States . .. ..
74. 97 S.Ct. at 1217.
75. Id.
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language in Juidice,76 as well as in Huffrnan,7 7 which could still be read as a
basis for the extension of the Younger doctrine that Justice Brennan predicts,
the majority's analysis actually supports the proposition that the state interest
in the civil proceedings must be "important" for Younger to apply. This would
clearly limit the application of Younger in the civil context.
It is therefore submitted that a third reading of Juidice is the most
accurate. According to this analysis, the Court has moved toward a balancing
approach which should limit the extension of Younger in civil cases. This
conclusion is supported by the majority opinion in Juidice which focused on
the importance of the contempt process to the state judicial system. The Court
emphasized that although this process benefited the interests of private
litigants, it also served to maintain the authority of the state judicial system. 78
The Court was careful to note that the state's interest in its contempt process
is not as strong as its interests in its criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. 7 9
Nevertheless the Court concluded that there was a sufficiently important state
interest to warrant abstention on comity grounds.80
Therefore, Juidice need not be broadly interpreted to extend Younger
principles to civil cases where no important state interest is involved. The
Court characterized the interference with the state's contempt process as " 'an
offense to the State's interest. . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be
were this a criminal proceeding.' "8,1 The significance of the state's interest in
its criminal laws has traditionally been acknowledged.8 2 By comparing the
possible injury to the state interest in Juidice with the injury to the state by
federal interference in its criminal processes, Juidice can be viewed as
requiring a state interest of great significance before Younger principles will
76. To support its extension of Younger in Juidice, the Court quoted from Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), which established federal court power to issue injunctive relief against state
officials. "[Tihe Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were
already pending in a state court." Id. at 162. It would seem that the rationale of this quotation
would require dismissal of the federal action whether pending state proceedings concerned
important state interests or not. This wording is sufficiently broad to require the application of
Younger in all civil cases.
77. In his opinion in Huffman, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "Younger turned on
considerations of comity and federalism peculiar to the fact that state proceedings were pending
. ." 420 U.S. at 606. Likewise, he felt that prospective section 1983 plaintiffs should not have
the "luxury" of a federal forum when state proceedings were ongoing. Id. at 60S-06. In addition,
he pointed out that a federal proceeding would reflect negatively on the state judicial system's
ability to enforce constitutional rights; this logic would apply with equal validity whether the
state proceeding were criminal or civil. Id. at 604.
78. 97 S.CL at 1217 n.12.
79. Id. at 1217.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
82. See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120-21 (951); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 94-95 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926). See generally
Equitable Abstention, supra note 34, at 882. In Huffnan, the Court characterized the state
interest in quasi-criminal proceedings as virtually identical to the state interest in its criminal
proceedings. 420 U.S. at 604.
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apply in the civil context. Only those state interests of "sufficiently great
import"8 3 would outweigh the federal interest, under section 1983, in prevent-
ing the deprivation of constitutional rights by state action. If a state interest
did not meet that standard, federal equitable relief could be granted.84 Thus,
under this third reading, Juidice replaces the Huffman quasi-criminal stan-
dard with a balancing analysis that looks to the importance of the state
interest in determining the applicability of Younger in the civil context.
Under any reading, Juidice marks an extension of Younger principles and a
concomitant narrowing of available federal relief under section 1983. There-
fore, the trend started in Huffman continues.85 Yet, in neither Juidice nor
Huffman has the Court attempted to reconcile explicitly the principles of
federalism embodied in the Younger doctrine with the objectives of Congress
expressed in section 1983.86 Indeed, it is possible to read the majority opinions
in Juidice and Huffman without even realizing that there is an inherent
tension between the two. 87 Nevertheless, it is clear from Juidice that at least
where there is an important state interest involved in an ongoing state civil
proceeding, Younger will require dismissal of the section 1983 federal suit.
Conversely, the language of Juidice supports the implication that where no
important state interest is involved, the objectives of section 1983 will best be
attained by allowing a federal court to reach the merits of constitutional
claims.
John Gallagher, Jr.
83. 97 S.Ct. at 1217. Several lower court cases have looked to the importance of the state
interest involved before determining that Younger principles mandated federal restraint: Williams
v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976) (important state interest in domestic relations); Littleton
v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1976) (same); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 197-98 (7th
Cir. 1975) (important state interest in eminent domain sy.,tem); Burdick v. Miech, 409 F. Supp.
982, 984-85 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (important state interest in paternity proceedings).
84. See Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1362 (5th Cir. 1976) (state interest in
operation of postjudgment garnishment statutes not sufficiently important to merit application of
Younger principles).
85. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
86. Compare the majority opinions in Juidice and Huffman with that of Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972), where the Court carefully analyzed the purposes of both the federal
anti-injunction statute and section 1983 before reconciling the two. See notes 36-38 supra and
accompanying text.
87. But see the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan in both Juidice, 97 S.Ct. at 1220,
and Huffman, 420 U.S. at 613. This tension between the Younger doctrine and the congressional
purpose behind section 1983 was discussed in Wall v. American Optometric Ass'n, 379 F. Supp.
175, 186-87 (N.D. Ga.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Wall v. Hardwick, 419 U.S. 888
(1974).
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Labor Law-Representation Election-Discriminatory Conduct of a
Union Does Not Bar the Granting of Certification as Exclusive Bargain-
ing Representative.-An election conducted to determine the collective
bargaining representative for the employees of Handy Andy, Inc., was won by
Teamsters' Local 657.1 In the past, Local 657 had been found to have engaged in
discriminatory practices. 2 The employer therefore filed exceptions with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to the Regional Director's recommen-
dation that Local 657 be certified as exclusive bargaining representative for
Handy Andy's employees. The employer contended that, pursuant to the
NLRB's holding in Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 3 Local 657 was disqualified
from being certified because of its prior history of engaging in discriminatory
practices. The NLRB reversed its ruling in Bekins and held that the Board is not
authorized to withhold certification from a labor organization selected by a
majority of the employees because of discriminatory practices of the union.4
Instead, the NLRB stated that allegations of discrimination are more appro-
priately raised at alater date in a full hearing pursuant to an unfair labor practice
complaint.5 Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (Feb.
25, 1977).
This Note will discuss the two main issues in Handy Andy: (a) whether the
NLRB's certification of a labor organization as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive constitutes state action which violates the fifth amendment's due process
clause, and (b) whether the NLRB's certification of a union which engages in
discriminatory practices comports with the objectives of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act).
The NLRB's policy of denying certification to a union found to discriminate
based upon race, alienage, or national origin evolved from NLRB v. Mansion
House Center Management Corp.6 The employer was found by the NLRB to
have violated the Act by refusing to bargain7 with the certified bargaining
representative.8 The employer's defense had been that no duty to bargain
existed, since the union practiced racial discrimination. The Eighth Circuit
1. Teamsters'Local 657 received 108 out of the 174 ballots cast. The unit in question contained 58
blacks and 114 Spanish-surnamed individuals; 162 of a total of 211 employees were minority group
members. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.RB. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1360 (Feb. 25, 1977).
2. Local 657 had been aiding employers in perpetuating discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin through a seniority scheme. See Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, SOS F.2d 40
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 1891 (1977); Herrera v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 66
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 1891 (1977); Resendis v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., SOS
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 1891 (1977). Reversal of these cases followed the
NLRB's decision in Handy Andy, Inc., the case to which this Note is directed. The Supreme Court
held the seniority scheme was not discriminatory.
3. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
4. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1355 (Feb. 25, 1977).
5. Id. at 1355-56.
6. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
7. A violation of the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
8. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 190 N.L.RtB. 437 (1971), enforcement denied in
part, 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
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refused to enforce the Board's order, reasoning that there is state action when the
Board recognizes a union which discriminates, because it "becomes a willing
participant in the union's discriminatory practices." 9 Therefore, the Constitu-
tion required the NLRB to evaluate a charge of racial discrimination before
certifying a union which had won a representative election.10 Noting that the law
in the area needed to be more fully developed, the court left it for the Board to
derive a manageable procedure.1 1
The Board responded in Bekins Moving & Storage Co. 1 2 An employer sought
to block a representation election on the ground that the union discriminated on
the basis of sex and national origin. The NLRB ordered an election to be
conducted, but it stated that in the future it would consider a union's
discriminatory conduct before certifying it as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive. 13 In reaching this conclusion, the Board concurred with the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Mansion House that certification constituted state action which aids
discrimination.1 4 It was the Board's opinion that if a federal agency were to
confer benefits upon a union engaging in invidious discrimination, it would in
effect be sanctioning and even furthering the union's continued discrimination,
thereby violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Is
Although the Act apparently mandates that a certificate of representation be
issued,1 6 the Board argued that a collateral duty of fair representation is con-
9. 473 F.2d at 473. The court reasoned that the state prohibition against racial discrimination by
the state contained in the fourteenth amendment was applicable to the federal government under the
fifth amendment. Id. at 472-73; see Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). " '[W]hile the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that Is "so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." ' That racial discrimination is so invidious as to
be unjustifiable cannot be denied. Accordingly, any recognition or enforcement of illegal racial
policies by a federal agency is proscribed by the Due Proce.ss Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 473
F.2d at 473 (footnote omitted) (citing Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964)).
10. Id. at 474.
11. Id. at 474-75; see Naffziger, The NLRB Attitude on Discrimination and the Judicial
Response, 26 Labor L.J. 21, 28-29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Naffziger], wherein the author
indicates that even after Mansion House and Bekins the NLRB is still considered relatively
ineffective in the discrimination area.
12. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
13. Id. Consideration of discrimination, however, is limited to the suspect classifications of race,
alienage, and national origin. Id. at 143 (Kennedy, member, concurring); see Bell & Howell Co., 213
N.L.R.B. 407 (1974).
14. 211 N.L.R.B. at 138-39. "['TIhe Supreme Court has held repeatedly that neither the Federal
nor the state governments may take any action in furtherance or support of, or assistance to, any
forms, or practices of discrimination." Id. at 139; see notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 139. It was the Board's premise that certification placed a labor organization in the
position whereby it could continue to exercise its discriminatory practices.
16. "If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." National Labor
Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970); see 211 N.L.R.B. at 147 (dissenting opinion);
notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text.
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tained in the Act and the Constitution. 17 According to the Board, these two
mandates are not mutually exclusive, but must be construed together. Therefore
it held that issuance of a certificate of representation without consideration of a
union's ability to represent employees fairly would iriolate the Constitution.'
The Board concluded that in the future it would review a union's ability to
represent its employees fairly on a case-by-case basis, and then determine
whether it had the constitutional power to certify the results of the election. ' 9
Fewer than three years later the NLRB inHandy Andy reversed its position.
20
One of the primary reasons 21 given by the Board for the reversal was that the
Bekins majority had misconstrued the state action doctrine.2 2
The concept of state action, as applied to government involvement in other-
17. Id. at 139; see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248 (1944).
18. 211 N.L.R.B. at 139. "Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that any statute
purporting to bestow upon a union the exclusive right to represent all employees would be
unconstitutional if it failed to impose upon the union this reciprocal duty of fair representation."
Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (Sth Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967).
The Board held that, although the statute does not specifically grant the power to withhold
certification, the Constitution does not permit the issuance of a certificate to a union which
invidiously discriminates. 211 N.L.R.B. at 139.
19. 211 N.L.R.B. at 139. The procedure was met with mixed reaction. Although the dissent
argued strongly that this procedure violated the statutory mandate to issue a certificate, id. at 147
(dissenting opinion), several circuit courts have acknowledged that the Board can withhold
certification. See, e.g., NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 13 (ist Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 929-30 (Sth
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). Several commentators foresaw a potential problem
in the overlap of jurisdiction between the NLRB and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the resulting difficulty of coordinating remedies. See, e.g., Meltzer, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The Afore Remedies, the Better? 42 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Meltzer]; ABA Section of the Labor Relations Law,
Report of the 1974 Proceedings in Honolulu 191 (remarks of Professor Morris). A situation might
arise where, after the Board has determined discrimination existed and denied certification, a suit
brought before the EEOC is dismissed for failure to find discrimination.
A further criticism was that Bekins illustrates the Board's uncertainty over how to approach
discrimination. ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Report of the 1975 Proceedings in Montreal
53 (remarks of Professor Hanslowe). This is borne out by the subsequent cases decided under Bekins
and the lack of unanimity of opinion among the Board. See Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B.
407 (1974) (2 majority, 1 concurring, 2 dissenting); Grant's Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B.
410 (1974) (2 majority, 3 concurring). On the positive side, one commentator envisioned Mansion
House and Bekins as forcing unions to desist from discriminatory practices. For if the union
failed to do so, the Board would revoke or prevent the union from being recognized as exclusive
bargaining representative. Naffziger, supra note 11, at 27.
20. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.RR.M. 1354 (Feb. 25, 1977).
21. Another and perhaps the most important reason was the change in the composition of the
Board. Only one, Jenkins, of the three Board members advocating the position in Bekins remains.
22. Id. at 1356.
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wise private discrimination, originated in Shelley v. Kraemer. 23 In Shelley, local
courts had enforced restrictive covenants which prohibited the sale of land to
blacks. Even though private agreements to engage in discriminatory practices do
not violate the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that enforcement of a
private agreement by a state court violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment because such conduct constituted state action. 24 The
Court reasoned that the discriminatory purpose of the agreements could not be
secured without the active intervention of the courts in enforcing the agree-
ments. 25 The key element in Shelley defining state action was qffirmative en-
forcement of the private agreement to discriminate. 26 Thus, if a governmental
agency affirmatively aids private discrimination, there is state action.
The existence of state action, however, is not limited to cases in which there is
affirmative enforcement of private discrimination. Courts also find state action
when there are mutual benefits exchanged between a governmental entity and a
private party which discriminates. 27 There are two leading cases in this area,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority28 and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ir-
vis. 29 In Burton there was state action because the state as lessor was involved in
a "symbiotic relationship" with the discriminating lessee. 30 In Moose Lodge the
Court found there was not state action even though a state liquor authority
granted a license to a private club which refused to serve blacks. 3 1 The question
of whether the NLRB-union relationship involved in the certification procedure
is state action may be answered by comparing it with the fact patterns of these
two cases.
In Burton the Supreme Court emphasized the failure of the municipal parking
authority lessor to prevent discrimination by inclusion of a clause in the lease
requiring the restaurant to serve blacks. 32 This approach is not applicable to the
problems dealt with in Handy Andy. First, the land and the building the
restaurant occupied were owned by the parking authority and upkeep and
external repairs were the responsibility of the parking authority. 33 A parallel
relationship does not exist between the NLRB and a labor organization. Second,
the "symbiotic relationship" arising from the interdependence of the parking
authority and the restaurant has no analogue in the procedure by which the
23. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. Id. at 20-21.
25. Id. at 13-14.
26. This same element appears in two other decisions as well. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967) (a state constitution which prohibited any governmental agency from abridging
the right of a property owner to refuse to sell or lease as he saw fit was held to be prohibited state
action); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (a local ordinance requiring seg-
regation was found to be state action).
27. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
28. Id.
29. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
30. 365 U.S. at 723-24; see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
31. 407 U.S. at 175-76.
32. 365 U.S. at 725.
33. Id. at 724.
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NLRB certifies a union. Both the parking authority and the restaurant received
mutual benefits from their association. 34 These benefits included such items as a
convenient place for patrons of the restaurant to park, which meant a
corresponding increase in customers for the parking facility, the tax-exempt
status of the physical improvements made by the lessee, and the profits which the
state earned from rental of the restaurant.3 s The NLRB and the union confer no
analogous benefits upon each other. Of course, the union does receive a
certificate of representation and is free from challenge from another union for a
year, 36 but at the same time certification also imposes duties on the union,
including the duty of fair representation. 37 The only benefit received by the
Board for certifying the union is the intangible one of achieving labor peace, one
of the purposes of the Act. 38 Comparing the mutual benefits received in the
NLRB-union relationship with those described in Burton, there appears to be
little room for analogy.
One other key factor in finding state action in Burton was the parking
authority's failure to include a provision in the lease affirmatively requiring the
restaurant not to practice discrimination. 39 Since the Act requires the NLRB to
enforce the duty of fair representation, however, it cannot be said that the Board
is guilty of the same type of neglect. Using this analysis, a Burton-type fact
pattern does not appear to exist when the NLRB certifies a union as an exclusive
bargaining representative.
The relationship appears to be more closely analogous to the facts in Moose
Lodge. In Moose Lodge it was alleged that state licensing of a private club which
refused to serve blacks constituted state action. The Court held there was no
state action for the following reasons. First, the lodge was a private social club
which occupied a private building. As a result, the lessee-lessor relationship
existing in Burton was not present. 40 Secondly, the Court pointed out that the
liquor control board plays "no part in [either] establishing or enforcing the
membership or guest policies" of its licensees. 4 1 Unlike the liquor control board,
however, the NLRB does influence membership policies-but the influence
exerted by the NLRB helps prevent discrimination. When it certifies a union the
Board designates that union as exclusive bargaining representative 42 and
imposes a duty to represent all members equally.4 3 A union found discriminat-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1366 (dissenting
opinion).
37. See cases cited in note 17 supra. The full import of the duty will be discussed at notes 60.61
infra and accompanying text.
38. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (preamble to the Act).
39. 365 U.S. at 725.
40. 407 U.S. at 175.
41. Id.
42. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
43. The duty of fair representation was established in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944), and was held to apply to labor unions in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248
(1944). See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
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ing can have its status as exclusive bargaining representative revoked. 44
Therefore, since the Board is actually charged with discouraging discrimina-
tion, there is even less state involvement in discriminatory conduct than there
was with the liquor control board in Moose Lodge.
Another factor that the Court examined in Moose Lodge was the extent of the
liquor control board's regulation of private clubs. 45 Regulation included stan-
dards for the physical construction of the premises, a requirement that a list of
names and members be supplied to the board, that extensive financial records be
maintained, and that the board be given access to the premises for inspection at
any time. In discounting the pervasiveness of state involvement, 46 the Court
stated that the regulation in no "way foster[ed] or encourage[d] racial discrimi-
nation." 4 7
The nature of certification is the key to determining whether regulation by the
NLRB is pervasive enough to constitute state action. If certification is a mere
mechanical function of the Board, as the Handy Andy majority contends, 48 there
is probably no state action. However, if certification is something more-in
particular, if it is involvement more extensive than the liquor control board in
Moose Lodge-state action might be found. The question is whether the NLRB's
certification of a union which discriminates constitutes such pervasive regulation
of the union as to support the conclusion that the NLRB fosters or encourages
discrimination.
The Board plays a passive role in the certification procedure. After a petition is
filed by a labor organization seeking to be recognized as a bargaining representa-
tive for a unit of employees, the NLRB conducts an investigation to determine
whether a question of representation exists. If the Board determines that a valid
question exists, an election is directed and the results are certified. 49 Certification
validates the election results.50 The NLRB provides machinery to determine the
desires of the employees. 5 1 It does not do this to aid the labor organization, but
rather to aid the employees presently working for an employer. The employees
may select a good or bad labor organization or none at all; the onus of making an
intelligent selection rests squarely on the employees. 52
An argument can be made, however, that the Board's role in certification is
more than that of a passive ballot counter, because certain benefits are conferred
44. Teamsters Local 671, 199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972) (discrimination against part-time
warehouse employees); Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577 (1964) (discrimination
against black workers).
45. 407 U.S. at 176-77.
46. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974), where the Court held that
extensive regulation in and of itself does not create state action. Instead, the Court looked for a
Burton-type of connection between the private party and the state regulatory agency. Id. at
357-58.
47. 407 U.S. at 176-77.
48. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1357 (Feb. 25, 1977).
49. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
50. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1357 (Feb. 25, 1977).
51. Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 850, 851 (1962).
52. Id. at 851.
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upon a labor organization which is certified by the NLRB. Thus, an employer is
placed under a statutory duty to bargain,5 3 and a union receives both the
exclusive right to represent all the employees, 5 4 free from challenge for a year, s s
and the "presumption that its majority status continues after a year."5 6
Therefore, it could be argued that certification is not solely a mechanical
function, and that it does foster or encourage discrimination.
However, a certified union is not authorized to practice discrimination in the
exercise of these rights. If a union does practice discrimination, the NLRB
possesses the power to revoke the certification.5 7 The one-year protection and the
majority status would thereby be terminated. A union is also subject to discipline
if it attempts to force an employer to hire on the basis of union membership.5 8 It
therefore would be difficult for a union to change the composition of the work
force to conform to the union's prior racial make-up by insisting that an employer
hire only union members. Moreover, the existing minority members in the work
force would be protected by the application of the doctrine of fair representation.
This doctrine requires that a union represent all members in the unit equally and
prohibits it from favoring one group of members over another.59 A union's
bargaining power must be exercised in furtherance of this duty. 60 Therefore,
even though certain benefits are conferred upon the union when the Board
certifies it, certification cannot be said to foster or encourage discrimination
because at the moment a union is certified it becomes subject to the Board's
sanctions against discrimination. As in Moose Lodge there is no enforcement of
the discrimination, and accordingly there is no state action.
When alternative remedies are available to an aggrieved individual, courts are
wont to apply the state action doctrine to fashion a remedy. An examination of
the state action cases reveals that in those cases where government involvement
with private discrimination was viewed as state action, the Constitution was
"the only available remedy against governmental support or toleration."16' In
53. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1S8(a)(S) (1970).
54. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
55. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
56. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1366 (dissenting opinion).
57. Teamsters Local 671, 199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972); Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B.
1573, 1577 (1964).
58. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
59. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. SO
(1975); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 18445 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963). The NLRB's ruling in Miranda, holding that a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion was an unfair labor practice, was upheld in Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
60. The doctrine of fair representation was developed in a series of Supreme Court decisions and
imposes upon the union the duty to represent all employees "fairly and impartially." Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). The duty "includes a statutory obligation to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967). Violation of this duty is an unfair labor practice. Id. at 178; Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
61. Meltzer, supra note 19, at 9.
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Shelley, for example, if state action had not been found, there would have been
no means of preventing covenants restricting the sale of land to blacks from
having full effect. 62 Similarly, in Burton the finding of state action was the only
means whereby discrimination by the restaurant owner could be stemmed. 63
62. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948).
63. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). This point is illustrated by the
Court's holdings in other cases. In a case with a fact pattern similar to Burton, the Court held that a
private restaurant located in a municipal airport must cease discrimination. The relationship which
existed between the municipality and the restaurant created a symbiotic relationship which resulted
in state action. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). The Court acknowledged that
absent state action there was no means to prevent discrimination. Id. at 353.
In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), an amusementpark guard requested several blacks to
leave the premises, pursuant to a long standing policy of segregation. When the blacks refused to
leave, they were arrested and later convicted. The Court noted that although the guard was privately
employed, he had been deputized by state authorities. As a result, his enforcement of the amusement
park's discriminatory practices constituted state action, and the convictions were set aside. Absent a
finding of state action, the Court would have been powerless to reverse the convictions.
In Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), blacks were arrested for trespassing when
they sat at an all-white lunch counter. A local ordinance prohibited the serving of blacks and whites
at the same place. In finding discrimination and reversing the convictions, the Court held that the
state by enacting the ordinance removed from the individual the choice and, therefore, constituted
state action. As with Giffin, alternative grounds for overturning the convictions were not available.
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), a white school teacher brought six students,
all blacks, to the defendant's lunch counter. The students were served, but the teacher was not. Upon
her protest, she was arrested. In an action against the store owners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that they conspired with the police to deprive her of her civil rights, the Court refused to dismiss the
suit on the gounds that the defendants were private individuals. The Court held that if the teacher
could establish at trial a state-enforced custom of segregation in public restaurants, state action
would exist and the cause of action would lie. If the Court had not found state action, the teacher
would not have had a remedy against the defendants.
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the state had a policy of loaning textbooks to private
schools. This policy was challenged on the gound that the schools practiced racial discrimination and
that the support provided by the state in loaning the textbooks constituted state action. The Court
found that state action was present, since the giving of the textbooks to the private schools constituted
tangible economic support in aid of discrimination. Although the Constitution provided no remedy
for discrimination in private schools, the Court was able to prevent the state from supporting the
discrimination.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), involved an injunction prohibiting the city
from making available public recreation facilities exclusively to segregated private groups. One of the
questions with which the Court was faced was how extensive this injunction was. The Court held
that the prohibition could not be extended to any mere use by a private group which practiced
discrimination, but if the city provided any support to the group, it would constitute state action. The
group would thus be banned from use of the public facility. Id. at 574. Thus, though the Court could
not ban the private groups completely from the public facilities, it was able to use the state action
doctrine to curtail the utilization by private segregated groups. There was no other action available to
the Court to limit the discriminatory practices.
In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), a parcel of land was devised to be used as a park for
members of the white race. The city undertook the management of the park, and an action was
brought claiming that this participation by the city violated the equal protection clause. The Court
found state action, and, additionally, held that even if management of the park were placed in the
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Therefore, if adequate alternate remedies are available to an individual hurt by a
union's discriminatory practices, courts would probably not find that state action
exists in the NLRB-union relationship involved in the certification procedure.
Several alternative remedies are, in fact, available when a union practices
discrimination. Union membership policies which discriminate against or bar
minorities violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 The standards laid down by the
Mansion House court for the Board to follow when dealing with discriminatory
conduct of unions are identical to those utilized by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC). 65 As discussed above, the NLRB has other
remedies to apply as well. 66 Since these other remedies are available, it is difficult
to reach a determination that the NLRB is affirmatively enforcing discrimina-
tion, and accordingly state action prohibited by the due process clause of the fifth
amendfiaent can be said not to exist. Moreover, a court confronted with this
problem is freed from having to fall back on the state action doctrine in order to
fashion a remedy for the discrimination. 67
Aside from the problem of state action, the question remains whether the
procedure set out in Handy Andy will further the purposes of the Act. Recently,
the Supreme Court considered an analogous situation in NAACP v. Federal
Power Commission.68 The NAACP attempted to compel the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) to issue a rule "requiring equal employment opportunity and
non-discrimination in the employment practices of its regulatees. "69 The FPC
contended it lacked jurisdiction to promulgate such a rule, since its statutory
authority extended only to economic regulation of those engaged in resource
development. 70 The Supreme Court agreed that the FPC need not issue the rule
and held that the scope of regulation must be confined to the purpose of the
hands of private individuals, state action would still exist, as the service provided was municipal in
character. The Court was thus able to use state action to prevent private land from being used in a
discriminatory manner. As in Gilmore, this was the only remedy the Court could supply.
64. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to h-6 (1970 & Supp. 1U 1972).
65. In NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 47S-77 (8th Cir.
1973), the court discussed the admissibility of the offer of proof provided by Mansion House to
establish the union's discrimination. The Board had rejected the offer of proof because it only
asserted the imbalance of the union's membership and did not allege that the union actually denied
membership on the basis of race. Id. at 475. In holding that the Board erred in not admitting the offer
of proof, the court drew primarily from Title VII cases, and in remanding the case, the court
indicated that the Board must consider this type of information. Id. at475-77; see Handy Andy, Inc.,
228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1358 n.30 (Feb. 25, 1977). The Eighth Circuit
interpretation of Title VII appears, however, to be incorrect, since the Supreme Court has indicated
that it "never [has] held that the constitutional standard[s] for adjudicating claims of invidious
racial discrimination [are] identical to the standards applicable. under Title VII. . . ." Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Furthermore, Professor Meltzer points out that the
"Constitution does not provide an adequate basis for the disqualification imposed by Mansion
House." Meltzer, supra note 19, at 11.
66. See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text.
67. This was seen in the cases previously cited. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
68. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
69. Id. at 664 (quoting the petition of the NAACP).
70. Id.
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regulatory legislation. 71 The FPC's authority to consider discriminatory
employment practices, the Court held, exists only insofar as the consequences of
the discrimination are directly related to the establishment of rates. 72 A govern-
ment agency's primary concern must be to fulfill the purpose for which it was
established.
Chief Justice Burger stated in a concurring opinion that primary responsibility
for preventing discrimination was centralized in the EEOC. When diffusion of
authority among administrative agencies occurs, congressional intent in estab-
lishing the various agencies is frustrated. 73 As a result, "regulated industries are
subjected to the commands of different voices in the bureaucracy, and the
agonizingly long administrative process grinds even more slowly."
'7 4
The primary purpose of the NLRB is to eliminate obstructions to the free flow
of commerce by promoting tranquility in labor-management relations. 75 An
essential element in achieving this end is the representation machinery, i.e., the
procedure whereby a labor organization obtains certification as exclusive bar-
gaining representative for a unit of employees. 7 6 Part of that procedure involves
conducting an election among the employees and certifying the results. The Act
directs that once the election is held and the votes counted, the Board "shall
certify the results thereof. '77 This language mandates that the Board issue a
certificate of representation. Moreover, in accordance with the principles of
NAACP v. FPC,7 the Board is required to fulfill its statutory purpose of
certifying the union. The resolution of discrimination charges, as the Court
stated in NAACP, should be left to another bramch of the government, 9 or else
the Board should use its other statutory powers to deal with discrimination at a
later date.
In Bekins the majority held that, in addition to conflicting with fifth amend-
ment due process requirements, the granting of a certificate to a labor organiza-
tion which practiced discrimination was prohibited by the doctrine of fair
representation.8 0 There are two important reasons, however, why the Bekins
solution of considering, during the certification procedure, the effect of a union's
discriminatory practices on the union's ability to represent fairly the employees is
poor labor policy. First, in stressing the duty of fair representation over the
statutory mandate that the Board certify whichever union wins the election, the
approach of the Bekins majority results in the suspension of an important
71. Id. at 669-70.
72. Id. at 671.
73. Id. at 673-74 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
74. Id. at 674 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Additionally, Chief Justice Burger noted that when the
FPC denies a license to a regulatee because of discriminatory practices, it is "thrust .. .into a
complex, volatile area for which Congress has already assigned authority to the EEOC." Id.
75. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. !1 151 (1970).
76. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. ,1 159 (1970).
77. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
78. 425 U.S. 662 (1976); see notes 69-75 supra and accompanying text.
79. See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 9-10.
80. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 139 (1974). For a discussion of the
duty of fair representation, see notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
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right-the right of the employees to have a bargaining representative.8" For
example, the representation election can involve more than one union vying for
status as bargaining representative. 82 If the union practicing discrimination wins
the election, the employees are left without a representative when the Board
refuses to certify the victorious union. Second, the application of the Bekins
procedure does not require fair representation for all employees. Instead, the
inquiry is narrowly limited to discrimination based upon race, alienage, or
national origin.8 3 The duty of fair representation, therefore, as applied by the
Bekins majority, should not by itself be sufficient ground for ignoring the
mandate of the Act to certify a union, since that duty runs counter to the primary
aim of facilitating collective bargaining.
A better approach is that proposed by the NLRB in Handy Andy, Inc.,
relegating consideration of discrimination to a post-certification unfair labor
practice proceeding for the failure to represent the employees fairly 84 This
procedure whereby inquiry into a union's discriminatory practices is postponed
until after certification furthers the Board's policy of handling representation
questions in the most expeditious manner.85 In the interest of expediency, a
pre-certification investigation is conducted in a non-adversary atmosphere, 86
while an unfair labor practice proceeding is adversary in nature.87 Meanwhile,
adequate pre-certification procedures are always available to prevent dis-
criminatory practices that would affect the free selection of a bargaining rep-
resentative. For example, under established law, the use of discriminatory
pre-election propaganda is the basis for setting aside an election, 88 and the usual
rule that a collective bargaining agreement serves as a bar to another election is
suspended if it is shown that the incumbent union discriminates.8 9
Due process considerations are another factor which indicates the Handy
Andy approach is correct. When a labor organization's capacity to provide fair
representation is challenged in a non-adversary pre-certification proceeding, the
union's right to due process of law is denied. 90 Though the non-adversary
proceeding does permit each party to present evidence, 91 judicial review is not
available. Review can only be obtained in an independent action before a United
81. See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 24.
82. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
83. Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 408 (1974) (dismissal of petition for sex discrimi-
nation); Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 143 (1974) (concurring opinion) (sex
discrimination by itself is not sufficient grounds to deny certification).
84. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1363 (February 25, 1977).
85. Id. at 1361.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 101.20 (1976).
87. National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
88. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (1962).
89. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 61 (1962). Additionally, recognition of a union might
be denied if the union's constitution or bylaws contain a discriminatory membership clause.
Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1364 (Feb. 25, 1977) (concurring
opinion); National Labor Relations Act § 10(g), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
90. 94 L.RR.M. at 1361-62.
91. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.20(c), 102.66 (1976).
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States district court92 and is limited to those cases in which the NLRB acts in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.93
The review by the district court does not reach "factual finding[s] that the union
engaged in the disqualifying discrimination.1 94 Full due process protection, on
the other hand, is afforded when the issue is determined in an unfair labor
practice proceeding. The issues are litigated before an administrative law
judge, reviewed by the Board, and then can be reviewed by a circuit court of
appeals, where findings of fact can be evaluated. 9
Another reason why the Board should delay consideration of discrimination
charges until after certification is that it will thereby prevent an employer from
using frivolous discrimination charges to avoid bargaining with the union. 96 The
handling of objections is time consuming and would thwart the aim of the Board
to settle questions of representation as quickly as possible.
It appears that the Board's new position inHandy Andy is the proper course to
follow. The involvement of the NLRB in certifying a labor organization which
discriminates is insufficient to be classified as state action which violates the due
process prohibitions of the fifth amendment. In the absence of state action, the
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act mandate the granting of a
certification as exclusive bargaining representative, leaving the rectification of
discriminatory practices to other procedures.
Glenn F. McNamara
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96. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1360. The dissent notes that the experience under the Bekins procedure
does not bear out the contention that frivolous charges bog down the certification procedure. Id.
at 1367 (dissenting opinion).
